Consider two firms facing the demand curve P=90-5Q. where Q Q₁+Q2. The firms' cost functions are and C₁ (Q1) = 10+10Q1 C₂ (Q2) = 10+20Q2 Suppose that both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? Combined, the firms will produce units of output, of which Firm 1 will produce units. (Enter a numeric response using a real units and Firm 2 will produce number rounded to two decimal places.) What is each firm's equilibrium output and profit if they behave noncooperatively? Use the Cournot model. Firm 1's output 18 17 16- 15- 14- 13- 12- 11- 8- 6- 34 2- 1- 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Firm 2's output Instructor-created question What is each firm's equilibrium output and profit if they behave noncooperatively? Use the Cournot model. If the firms compete, then Firm 1 will produce ☐ units of output and Firm 2 will produce units of output. Draw the firms' reaction curves and show the equilibrium. To do this, draw Firm 1's reaction curve (RC₁) and Firm 2's reaction curve (RC2) in the figure to the right using the line drawing tool. Attach the appropriate labels. Then, indicate the Cournot Equilibrium (Equilibrium) using the point drawing tool. Attach the provided label. If you are not prompted for a label, then you have used the wrong drawing tool. How much should Firm 1 be willing to pay to purchase Firm 2 if collusion is illegal but a takeover is not? Firm 1 would be willing to pay $to purchase Firm 2 (so that Firm 2 does not to nmunal Click the graph, choose a tool in the palette and follow the instructions to create your graph. Firm 1's output 18- HW Score: 17.a Que 17- 16- 15- 14- 13- 12- 11- 10- 9- 8- 7 6 S 4- 3- 2- 1- 0- 012 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Firm 2's output